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DO CRIMINAL MINDS CAUSE CRIME? 
NEUROSCIENCE AND THE PHYSICALISM 
DILEMMA 
JOHN A. HUMBACH* 
ABSTRACT 
 
The idea that mental states cause actions is a basic premise of criminal 
law. Blame and responsibility presuppose that criminal acts are products 
of the defendant’s mind. Yet, the assumption that mental causation exists is 
at odds with physicalism, the widely shared worldview that “everything is 
physical.” Outside of law, there is probably no field of secular study in 
which one can seriously assert that unseen nonmaterial forces can cause 
physical events. But if physicalism is true then a fundamental premise of 
modern criminal justice must be false, namely, that criminals deserve 
punishment because their crimes are the products of their criminal minds. 
Efforts to reconcile mind-based theories of criminal responsibility with 
physicalism encounter a dilemma: how can one say that everything occurs 
in accordance with physical laws while insisting that offenders deserve 
blame and punishment precisely because their conduct is not dictated by 
physical laws? The dilemma highlights the fact that, even if mental states 
can cause actions, they would have to also be “autonomous” of the physical 
(and physical laws) to be morally significant. Unless causative mental states 
are untethered to underlying neuronal activity, people's actions are not 
their “own” but are merely products of causal chains originating outside 
themselves far back in time. Thus, if mental states are not autonomous, they 
could no more have independent moral significance than mental states that 
are purely epiphenomenal. But the supposition that mental states are 
autonomous leads to the unpalatable suspicion that the law sends people to 
prison and deprivation based on spooky-spectral New Age nonsense that no 
modern thinker would, in any other context, believe. 
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A fundamental dilemma is faced by traditional legal thinkers who claim 
to accept physicalism—a wholly material world without spirits or 
spooks1—but still want to believe that mental states, such as intentions,2 
play a role in deciding what people do. The dilemma concerns the law’s 
requirement that criminal acts be products of the defendant’s mind, and not 
just of the physical body.3 Our whole system of blame is founded on the 
belief that mental states can cause actions.4 People are not ordinarily 
considered guilty of crimes if their mental states were in no way involved 
in producing the bodily movements that constituted the criminal act.5 A 
reflex, for example, is not a crime, nor are acts done while unconscious.6 
This principle is explicit in the so-called “voluntary act” requirement, and 
is implicit the various requirements of mens rea that apply to most serious 
crimes.7 If, however, we live in a wholly material physicalist world, so that 
volition and intentions are simply the products of physical causes and 
effects, it would mean that a fundamental premise of modern criminal 
justice must be false—namely, the belief that criminals deserve punishment 
because their acts are the products of their criminal minds.  
 
 
*  Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University. 
1.  At its core, physicalism is the view that “everything is physical” (apart from abstract 
concepts, such as numbers) and that all the concrete stuff of the Universe consists of physical matter and 
energy, and of nothing else. See generally Daniel Stoljar, Physicalism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#TokTypPhy 
[https://perma.cc/QF8J-M7R6]; See also JAEGWON KIM, PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND 211 (1998) (“[T]he 
view that there are no concrete substances, in the space-time world other than material particles and their 
aggregates.”).  
2.  The term “mental state” is used here, as in law, with its “ordinary language, common 
sense” meaning. See Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges 
to Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 2–3, 10–11 (2008) [hereinafter Morse, 
Folk Psychology]; see also Stephen J. Morse, The Inevitable Mind in the Age of Neuroscience 35, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (Dennis Patterson & Michael S. Pardo 
eds., 2016) [hereinafter Morse, Inevitable Mind]. 
3.  See discussion and authorities cited in the companion to this article: John A. Humbach, 
Neuroscience, Justice and the “Mental Causation” Fallacy, 11 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 191, 195-97 (2019) 
(hereinafter Mental Causation Fallacy). 
4.  Cf. HUME, infra note 27. 
5.  See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952) (“The contention that 
an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It 
is . . . universal and persistent in mature systems of law . . . . A relation between some mental element 
and punishment for a harmful act is almost . . . instinctive”). See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, 
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 117–44 (6th ed. 2012); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 252–88 
(5th ed. 2010). 
6.  See MODEL PENAL CODE §2.01(1); see generally, Mental Causation Fallacy, supra note 
3, at 195-97. 
7.  See Mental Causation Fallacy, supra note 3, at 195-97. 
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The difficulty for the avowed physicalist is that legally relevant mental 
states such as intentions do not seem to be physical; they certainly do not 
seem to be comprised of the kind physical matter that occupies locations in 
time and space, nor are they like any form of physical energy found 
anywhere else in the universe. Rather, the law seems to understand mental 
causation to operate like some kind of intrabody psychokinesis, the pseudo-
scientific process by which just thinking about things can somehow make 
them happen.8 While perhaps not as far-fetched as preternatural spirits and 
spooks, the law’s pre-scientific “folk psychology” of mental causation9 is 
hard to reconcile with a non-romanticized, evidence-based physicalist view 
of the world.10   
One way to try to avoid this dilemma is to re-conceptualize the criminal 
law’s various required mental states as physical elements of the crime. 
Neuroscience provides some support for this approach. It is now essentially 
undisputed that the “mind” and mental states are dependent for their 
existence and content on the physical (neuronal) activity of the brain: if the 
brain is dead, the mind is dead—at least as far as we know. Moreover, it 
seems clear that all of the content of mental states (viz. mental images, the 
sounds and voices in our heads and, ultimately, our thoughts and reasoning 
about them) is ultimately sourced in the information about the world that is 
collected as raw data by the physical senses and neuronally processed by 
the brain. The mind has no known independent access to information about 
the outside world; all such content depends on the brain. And there is no 
evidence that mental states, such as intentions, can appear in consciousness 
in the absence of the underlying patterns of neuronal activity with which 
they seem invariably correlated.11 And so it could be argued that, just 
 
 
8.  See Mental Causation Fallacy, supra note 3, at 224-27. 
9.  See Morse, Folk Psychology, supra note 2, at 1, 2-3, 10-11 (“Roughly speaking, the law 
implicitly adopts the folk-psychological model of the person, which explains behavior in terms of 
desires, beliefs and intentions.”). 
10.  Stated another way, the law appears to follow a distinctly substance dualist conception of 
mental states and mental causation. Substance dualism, as “[a]pplied to the present context, posits the 
existence of both physical bodies and nonphysical minds whereas physicalism admits the existence only 
of physical objects and processes.” JAEGWON KIM, PHYSICALISM, OR SOMETHING NEAR ENOUGH 156 
(2005) [hereinafter KIM, PHYSICALISM]. The historically popular but now generally discredited theory 
of “substance dualism” advanced by Descartes, viz. that the body and mind (or “soul”) are two different 
substances, is most likely the conception of dualism that comes closest to that which is implicit in the 
law. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text for further discussion of dualism.  
11.  See, e.g., R.S. Calabrò, A. Cacciola, et al, Neural Correlates of Consciousness: What We 
Know and What We Have to Learn!, 36 NEUROLOGICAL SCI. 505 (2015), DOI: 10.1007/s10072-015-
2072-x, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25588680 [https://perma.cc/B2UL-RY7X]; Stanislas 
Dehaene, et al. The Global Neuronal Workspace Model of Conscious Access: From Neuronal 













maybe, intentions and other mental states are in fact nothing more than 
neural activities under a different description—just patterns of physical 
brain activity that we happen to experience as conscious awareness.12 If this 
view of mental states were correct—if mental states are fundamentally 
identical to physical states so it is, indeed, all just physical—the dilemma 
could be avoided. Physicalist-minded legal theorists could avoid the 
suspicion that the law sends people to prison and deprivation based on 
spooky-spectral New Age nonsense13 that no modern thinker would, in any 
other context, believe.  
Alas, however, the idea that mental states are identical with or otherwise 
“reducible” to physical states encounters a host of other difficulties14 and, 
for reasons suggested below15 (among others), there is good reason to doubt 
that our vivid subjective experience of mental states is “nothing more than” 
just arrangements or interactions of physical matter. The discussion that 
follows will focus on a difficulty that is of particular legal concern, namely: 
if the events we call mental states are physical in nature (that is, 
ontologically physical), then their occurrence, progression and content—
everything that we think, intend, desire, reason, etc.—would all be 
determined in accordance with physical law, and that would deprive mental 
causation of its distinctive moral significance. 
It is central to the physicalism thesis that every event must have either 
no cause at all (as in the case of random quantum events) or a physical cause 
that is sufficient, in itself, to produce the event. That is to say, physical 
events do not “just happen” (except at the quantum level) unless there are 
sufficient physical causes to make them happen. This principle is called the 
principle of “Causal Closure”16 and it is a corollary of physicalism itself: 
“everything is physical” entails that there are no paranormal or preternatural 
forces to make events occur.  
When applied to mental states (re-conceptualized as essentially 
physical), Causal Closure would mean that, whenever there are sufficient 





12.  See JOHN R. SEARLE, MIND: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 210 (2004), further discussed infra 
text accompanying notes 58-60. 
13.  For example, intrabody psychokinesis. See supra note 8. 
14.  An excellent and relatively accessible analysis of these difficulties is provided in KIM, 
PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 93-148. 
15.  See infra text accompanying notes 93-96. See also text accompanying notes 82-83. 
16.  More formally, the causal closure of the physical domain holds that “[i]f a physical event 
has a cause at [time] t, then it has a physical cause at t.” KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 15. 
Washington University Open Scholarship











automatically; if sufficient causes are absent, the mental state cannot occur. 
But this means in turn that even if, by physicalizing mental states, we can 
extricate mental causation from the suspicion of being a pre-scientific 
fabrication, such a re-conceptualization would deprive mental causation of 
the independent moral significance it needs to serve as a basis for attributing 
blame and criminal responsibility.17 For if mental states are essentially just 
physical in nature, totally dependent for their existence and content on 
sensory inputs processed according ordinary physical laws, then both 
mental states and the actions they produce would no longer be logically 
attributable to the person who acts. They would be, instead, the inevitable 
products of chains of causation originating outside the person far back in 
time. Thus, even if mental causation were true in the sense that physicalized 
mental states could cause actions, that fact would not logically provide a 
basis for saying that the criminal defendant’s actions are his own.  
In sum, the physicalism dilemma is this: The contents of causative 
mental states (e.g., intentions) can have distinctive moral significance only 
if they are independent and autonomous from the brain’s mechanistic 
physical processes. But if, as physicalism insists, every physical event that 
occurs must have a sufficient physical cause, then physicalized mental states 
would not be independent and autonomous but, rather, would be determined 
in accordance with physical laws. Such mental states would be, in essence, 
mere conduits for physical forces borne in chains of causation originating 
outside the person and, as such, lack independent moral significance. Thus, 
one must make a choice between either physicalism or mental-state moral 
autonomy and significance. To claim to embrace both is to land in a 
contradiction.  
None of this made much difference before the advent, in the past few 
decades, of intensive neuroscience research on the workings of the brain 
and the physiological bases of behavior.18 As long as mental causation was 
the only available plausible explanation to connect the thoughts people have 
with the things that they do, its reality could go unexamined and 
unquestioned. Now, however, neuroscience has presented us with a robust 
 
 
17.  Remember, to be criminal, an act must be a product of the defendant’s mind, not just the 
physical body. See Mental Causation Fallacy, supra note 3. 
18.  A recent study found that 1.79 million articles in the area of brain and neuroscience 
research were published from 2009 to 2013. Georgin Lau et al., New Report Maps the Landscape of 
Global Brain Research, ELSEVIER CONNECT (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.elsevier.com/connect/new-
reportmaps-the-landscape-of-global-brain-research [https://perma.cc/5G8X-PTXB]; see also RICHARD 
PASSINGHAM, COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 3 (2016) (“[N]early 30,000 
experiments conducted using fMRI alone.”). Much of this research is described and summarized in 













and detailed physiological explanation of how the behavior of people (and 
all other organisms with brains) is generated. According to this 
explanation,19 the brain neuronally processes information that comes in 
through the senses together with physically embodied information from 
previous inputs (memories) to determine the coordinated outputs that are 
sent through motor neurons to the muscle fibers that produce the bodily 
movements that constitute human behavior. The neuroscience explanation 
of how behavior comes about leaves no place for mental causation to play 
a role; it contains no gaps that mental causation is needed to fill.20 By 
contrast, mental causation—if it exists at all—remains completely 
unexplained, a naked conjecture based almost solely on logically fallacious 
inferences from blunt correlations that have well-documented physical 
explanations.21 In light of the findings of neuroscience it is extremely 
improbable that there is such a thing as mental causation.22 
There has, however, emerged a resilient corps of neuroskeptics who 
resist the conclusion that mental states play no part in producing human 
behavior and deny that neuroscience requires a broad rethinking of criminal 
justice practices. As pointed out by Professor Stephen J. Morse, a leading 
proponent of the neuroskeptical view, neuroscience’s mechanistic 
explanation of behavior is at odds with the longstanding and deeply-
entrenched belief that people have “agency,” viz. the ability to act 
intentionally and for reasons as the authors of their own acts.23 And moral 
responsibility, he adds, depends on agency.24 But Professor Morse and his 
 
 
19.  See SAPOLSKY, supra note 18, at 21–77, 535–36 (describing and summarizing how the 
brain chooses and produces bodily movements); PASSINGHAM, supra note 18, at 66–81; and other 
sources cited in Mental Causation Fallacy, supra note 3, at 193 n.6. 
20.  This is not to say there is not still much to learn about the details. Moreover, a frustrating 
reality is that, because the production of human behavior is such a radically multifactorial process, the 
task of getting and reading of all the many factors and taking them into due account is beyond present 
technologies. But it by no means follows that, just because we cannot measure all the physical factors 
that affect behavior, we are therefore free to assume that there are non-physical factors at work. See 
Mental Causation Fallacy, supra note 3 at 199-200. The weather and the stock market are similarly 
multifactorial, but nobody assumes for that reason that they are influenced by forces from outside the 
physical domain. 
21.  See SAPOLSKY, supra note 18, at 21-77, 535-36 (describing and summarizing how the 
brain chooses and produces bodily movements); PASSINGHAM, supra note 18, at 66-81; and other 
sources cited in Mental Causation Fallacy, supra note 3, at 193 n.6 and 224-38. 
22.  See Mental Causation Fallacy, supra note 3, at 216-34, 238-43. 
23.  Stephen J. Morse, Criminal Law and Common Sense: An Essay on the Perils and Promise 
of Neuroscience, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 40, 67 (2015) [hereinafter Morse, Common Sense] (describing 
agents as “creatures who act intentionally for reasons, who can be guided by reasons, and who in 
adulthood are capable of sufficient rationality to ground full responsibility unless an excusing condition 
obtains”). See also infra text accompanying notes 66-67. 
24.  Id. at 67 (“no responsibility is possible if we are not agents”); Morse, Inevitable Mind, 
supra note 2, at 36 (“responsibility judgments depend on … mental states”). See also infra text 
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fellow neuroskeptics face the dilemma just described: The mental causation 
hypothesis cannot be reconciled with physicalism unless mental states are 
indeed dependent on and controlled by the neuronal activity that underlies 
them. But if they are thusly dependent and controlled, they would lack the 
independent moral significance that is needed for ascribing responsibility 
and blame.  
The discussion that follows will expand on these points. Part I discusses 
the fundamental contradiction that is encountered when trying to embrace 
both physicalism as well as the idea that human beings are “agents” who are 
not subject to the usual constraints described in physical laws. Part II 
considers whether either “property dualism” or “emergentism” can provide 
an avenue to escape that contradiction, concluding they cannot. Part III 
notes that, while it does not seem plausible that mental states are fully 
“reducible” to physical states (that they are “nothing more” than physical 
states), that fact has no bearing on whether mental states have causative 
properties of their own. Finally, Part IV briefly discusses why it is important 
to criminal justice policy that we recognize the fundamental contradiction 
that infests the neuroskeptical view. 
I. MINIMAL PHYSICALISM AND “AGENCY”: THE CONTRADICTION 
When deciding cases, assessing damages, sending people to prison and 
otherwise resolving disputes, courts are normally meticulous in ascertaining 
the facts on which their judgments are based. However, there is a notable 
exception in the case of mental causation.25 The requirement that, for most 
serious crimes, the defendant is criminally responsible only if she 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engaged in the forbidden conduct or 
caused the forbidden result.26 In assessing criminal guilt the law simply 
assumes that, if the defendant acted with a culpable mental state, the 
wrongful act was the product of the defendant’s culpable mind.27 However, 
 
 
accompanying notes 40-48. See generally Markus Schlosser, Agency, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/agency/#SenAge 
[https://perma.cc/42AE-XAA3] (“The philosophy of action … construes action in terms of 
intentionality, while [the standard theory of action] explains the intentionality of action in terms of 
causation by the agent’s mental states and events. From this, we obtain a standard conception and a 
standard theory of agency.”). 
25.  Mental Causation Fallacy, supra note 3. 
26.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
27.  The presence of culpable mental states must be proved, as well as their concurrence with 
the crime’s actus reus, see State v. Rose, 311 A.2d 281 (R.I. 1973), but courts seem never to discuss 
whether there is proof that the required mental states actually caused the criminal acts to occur. While, 
as David Hume famously observed, causation itself is never directly observable, DAVID HUME, AN 













the putative causal efficacy of mental states does not even purport to be 
based on known facts about physical reality.  
There is probably no field of secular study in which a scholar can 
seriously assert that unseen immaterial forces are the true cause of physical 
events and not be laughed away. It is therefore unsurprising that the 
neuroskeptic friends of mental causation are eager to claim the mantle of 
physicalism,28 assuring their readers that they, too, believe “we inhabit a 
thoroughly material, physical universe in which all phenomena are caused 
by physical laws.”29 This avowed commitment to physicalism appears, 
however, to present neuroskepticism with a dilemma. How can one accept 
that “all phenomena are caused by physical laws”30 and then, at the same 
time, also insist that offenders deserve blame and punishment precisely 
because their wrongful conduct is caused by mental states, like intentions 
and reasons,31 that are not shackled to or determined by the mechanical laws 
of physics? 32  
Physicalism, or materialism, is a view of the world that rejects the 
“magical thinking” of the past in favor of explanations of events that are 
based on non-fallacious inferences from reliable physical evidence. Strictly 
speaking, it takes no position on matters as to which physical evidence is 
absent, but it insists that, where events have robust evidence of ordinary 
physical causation, non-physical explanations that lack supporting evidence 
 
 
observation does not mean that causation cannot be inferred from circumstantial evidence. It can; we do 
it every day, and some inferences are stronger than others, depending on the evidence. See Mental 
Causation Fallacy, supra note 3 at 238-43 (“inference to best explanation”). But the inference of mental 
causation is particularly weak and, indeed, fallacious, id. at 224-34, far too weak to serve the foundation 
and rationale for ascriptions of criminal responsibility, blame and guilt. Nor will it do to say (as some 
have tried) that the mere presence of culpable mental states is enough to justify ascribing blame and 
criminal responsibility, whether or not a defendant’s mental states have actual causal efficacy. See, e.g., 
Id. at 196 n.16. If a defendant’s culpable mental states are causally inert and, thus, have nothing to do 
with whether the crime occurs or not, their presence or not at the time of the crime should be legally 
irrelevant and it would be prejudicial error to inform the jury of them. It is like punishing a person for 
an earthquake because he ardently wished that it would occur.  
28.  The basic premise of physicalism is that all of the concrete stuff of universe consists of 
physical matter and energy, and of nothing else. See supra note 1. 
29.  See Morse, Common Sense, supra note 23, at 47; Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 2, at 
33.  
30.  Id.  
31.  See, e.g., Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra 2, at 33-34 (“Virtually everything for which we 
deserve to be praised or blamed and rewarded or punished is the product of mental causation. . . .The 
brain, in contrast, is a machine, an intricate, organic electrochemical machine. . . [M]achines may cause 
harm, but they cannot do wrong . . . . [O]nly people can do wrong. Machines do not deserve praise, 
blame, reward, or punishment.”). 
32.  See quotations in preceding footnote. 
Washington University Open Scholarship











must be eschewed. Physicalism is, in other words, the convention33 of 
strongly preferring physical explanations as the lingua franca or common 
ground for explaining and relating the events of the world. Its practical 
justification, based on centuries of experience, is that unless we require 
reliable physical evidence as the test for what to believe, there would be no 
end to the proliferation of imagined possible hypotheses and no dispositive 
way to decide among them. While all should be entitled to the beliefs they 
find personally comforting (“non è vero ma ci credo,” as the Neopolitans 
say34), it is another matter entirely for the state to punish and deprive on the 
basis of “truths” that are merely subjective.   
On the surface, the whole idea of mental causation seems at odds with 
even a “minimal” physicalism,35 which entails that “what happens in our 
mental life is wholly dependent on, and determined by, what happens with 
our bodily processes.”36 To be sure, minimal physicalism does not rule out 
the possibility of a purely parallel mental causation, a kind of “mental” 
causation that merely piggybacks on neuronal causation and whose effects 
on behavior are indistinguishable from the brain’s.37 But such a duplicative 
and functionally superfluous mental causation—which merely rides along 
with physical causation—hardly seems to count as the kind of “causation 
by intentions and reasons” that could provide the “agency,” which is said to 
be requisite for blame and punishment.38 All actions putatively caused by 
 
 
33.  That is, it is not an article of faith nor is it an ontological certainty, though it is probably as 
near to one as any empirical matter can be. See David Papineau, The Rise of Physicalism, in 
PHYSICALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS (Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer eds., 2001), 
https://www.academia.edu/819823/The_Rise_of_Physicalism [https://perma.cc/5A59-5GG9] 
(presenting arguments that have led to the near-universal acceptance of physicalism among modern 
scholars and researchers). 
34.  “It’s not true, but I believe it.” 
35.  Jaegwon Kim uses the term “minimal physicalism” to refer to “the shared minimum 
commitment of all positions that are properly called physicalist.” KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 
13. 
36.  KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 14.  
37.  See generally KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 32-46. Although minimal physicalism 
seems to include a principle of “Causal Closure” (roughly, every event has physical causes if it has any 
cause at all), see KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 15-16; David Papineau, The Causal Closure of 
the Physical and Naturalism 53, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (Beckermann, 
et al. ed., 2009); and supra notes 16 and accompanying text, the principle of Causal Closure does not in 
itself necessarily rule out mental causation. That is, minimal physicalism and Causal Closure do not in 
themselves deny the possibility that non-physical causes can co-occur with physical ones, as long as the 
physical causes would be sufficient causes in themselves. See KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 17. 
The problem for piggybacking mental causes is created, not by Causal Closure but by the so-called 
“exclusion principle.” See infra note 38.  
38.  See Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 2, at 46; Morse, Common Sense, supra note 23, at 
67; see also Pardo & Patterson, infra note 49, at 16 [online version] (making the same point). What is 
more, such a “piggybacking” variety of mental causation would seem to be excluded by the so-called 













that sort of parallel mental causation would, like the neuronal causation on 
which it piggy-backs, be mechanistically determined in accordance with 
physical laws.  
The would-be physicalist legal thinker seems therefore to be faced with 
an unpalatable choice: either renounce physicalism and its insistence that 
human behavior is determined by mechanistic physical laws, or embrace 
physicalism and give up the idea that mental states can play the distinct, 
non-mechanical role in causing conduct that is supposedly crucial to moral 
responsibility and punishment.39  
The dilemma can be illustrated by considering a contradiction that lies 
at the foundation of the neuroskeptical thesis, which will be represented here 
as laid out in the writings of Professor Morse, a leading and thoughtful 
exponent of the neuroskeptical viewpoint.40 When specifying his premises, 
Professor Morse insists that he accepts physicalism41 and he agrees that 
“human action and consciousness are produced by the brain, a material 
organ that works according to biophysical laws.”42 In other passages, 
however, he seems less convinced. He writes, for example, that mental 
states are “fundamental to a full explanation of human action,”43 that we do 
what we do “because we intend for reasons,”44 that mental states “produce 
… bodily movements,”45 and that there cannot be “genuine responsibility” 
unless people “have the capacity to determine their actions by reasons and 
to act in light of those reasons.”46 He repeatedly refers to the major moral 
 
 
dependent on the other, the dependent cause is otiose and “excluded” by the cause on which it depends. 
See generally KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 32-69. Kim’s statement of the exclusion principle 
is as follows: “No single event can have more than one sufficient cause occurring at any given time—
unless it is a genuine case of causal overdetermination [viz. causation of an event by two distinct causal 
chains].” Id. at 42. The point of exclusion principle is to avoid an arbitrary proliferation of putative 
causes. For more on the exclusion principle and Professor Morse’s attempt to dismiss it, see infra note 
62. 
39.  Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 2, at 33 and infra notes 58-60; see also other quotations 
infra text accompanying notes 43-49, 69-70. 
40.  See, e.g., Morse, Common Sense, supra note 23; Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 2.   
41.  See, e.g., Morse, Common Sense, supra note 23, at 47 (“I am a physicalist”); Morse, 
Inevitable Mind, supra note 2, at 33. Specifically, in the mind-body context, he says physicalism means 
that “[t]he brain enables the mind and action, but we have no idea how.” Morse, Common Sense, supra 
note 23, at 47. 
42.  Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 2, at 33 (emphasis added). 
43.  Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation: An Essay on Law and Neuroscience 530 (2011), in 
LAW & NEUROSCIENCE (Michael Freedman ed., 2011) [hereinafter Morse, Translation].   
44.  Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 2, at 33 (emphasis added). 
45.  Id. (“Responsibility judgments depend on the mental states that produce and accompany 
our bodily movements”) (emphasis added). 
46.  Morse, Common Sense, supra note 23, at 48 (emphasis added). Although Professor Morse 
states that “contra-causal freedom is simply not necessary” for responsibility, Morse, Inevitable Mind, 
supra note 2, at 45, this statement appears only to reaffirm his provisional acceptance of determinism in 
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difference he sees between “persons” and “machines”—for example, when 
he insists that an “electrochemical machine” like the brain cannot be a 
responsible agent or do wrong because “only people can do wrong,”47 or 
when he notes approvingly that “[t]he law treats persons generally as 
intentional creatures and not simply as mechanistic forces of nature.”48 
Assertions like these can only mean that there is, in Professor Morse’s view, 
a lot more to “agency” and human behavior than just doing whatever is 
dictated by the physiological brain. On the contrary, despite his avowed 
commitment to physicalism, he unambiguously ascribes a distinct causal 
role to mental states and sees them as able to rise above and transcend the 
“electrochemical machine” in producing human behavior.49 He does not, in 
short, sound at all like someone who actually believes in a thoroughly 
material, physical Universe.  
The direct contradiction in Professor Morse’s neuroskeptical thesis is 
hard to ignore. It cannot be true (as physicalism insists) that “all phenomena 
are caused by physical laws”50 and also be true that we are “creatures whose 
desires, beliefs, and intentions play a causal role in explaining our 
behavior”51—at least they cannot be playing a distinctive (non-
piggybacking) causal role. It is a contradiction that seems, moreover, to be 
intrinsic to any compatibilist52 theory of responsibility that builds on the 
 
 
general, and it does not say (nor is it apparently meant to say) that responsibility can exist even if human 
behavior is entirely dictated by the biomechanical activity of neurons.  
47.  Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 2, at 33-34; Morse, Folk Psychology, supra note 2, at 
6. 
 48.  Stephen J. Morse, Avoiding Irrational NeuroLaw Exuberance: A Plea for Neuromodesty, 
62 MERCER L. REV. 837, 840 (2011). 
49.  Cf. Iskra Fileva & Jonathon Tresan, Will Retributivism Die and Will Neuroscience Kill It? 
COGNITIVE SYSTEMS RESEARCH 9 (2015) (describing, but not necessarily endorsing, a similar 
conception of “agent-causation” which supposedly reconciles “full causation” with agent autonomy, 
reasoning that full causation occurs, as long as something caused the existence of the agent even if the 
agent, thus caused to exist, possesses the freedom to “make things happen” that are “caused by her” in 
the sense of determined by her).   
50.  Morse, Common Sense, supra note 23, at 47; Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 2, at 33. 
51.  Stephen J. Morse, Scientific Challenges to Criminal Responsibility, in JOEL FEINBERG ET 
AL., PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 844 (9th ed. 2014). 
52.  Compatibilism is (as described by Professor Morse) “a set of similar theories that hold with 
varying intensity that responsibility is possible in a deterministic universe as long as agents have the 
capacity to act according to their reasons” and intentions. Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 2, at 45; 
Stephen J. Morse, NeuroEthics: NeuroLaw OXFORD HANDBOOK ONLINE (2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2919011 [https://perma.cc/T4DV-ZEZP]. See 
generally Michael McKenna & D. Justin Coates, Compatibilism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 














assumption that human behavior is causally controlled or influenced by 
reasons, intentions, beliefs, or other mental states.53  
What makes the contradiction particularly intractable is the fact that 
mental-state causation would have no distinctive moral significance unless 
the causative mental states at work are, at least in some degree, autonomous 
of the neuronal activity that co-occurs with them. That is to say, in order for 
mental causation to make a moral difference, the processes of mentation that 
generate intentions, reasons and other causative mental states would have to 
be free to wander along paths of their own, through the byways of reason 
and thickets of thought, their content not tied to or dictated by the 
computational processes of the biomechanical brain.54 If causative mental 
states and the streams of thought leading up to them are not autonomous—
if they simply mirror the activity and outputs of the computational brain—
then mental causation would be essentially just a conduit for brain-state 
causation and wrongdoers would be blameless “victims of neuronal 
circumstances.”55 To avoid this conclusion and hold that mental states make 
 
 
53.  Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson put this contradiction into sharp focus in summarizing 
Professor Morse’s position: “In sum, mental states are produced by and realized in the brain (they are 
not a distinct substance), but they nonetheless exist and play a (non-reductive) causal role . . . .” Michael 
S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson, Morse, Mind and Mental Causation, 11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 111, 113 (2017) 
(describing their critique as “largely a friendly one”). In other words, what Professor Morse seems to be 
saying per Pardo and Patterson is in effect that mental states are physical (not a non-physical substance) 
and mental states are irreducibly non-physical—a logical contradiction. The expression “P and not-P” 
is a contradiction. See Tom Ramsey, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF LOGIC, 
http://www.math.hawaii.edu/~ramsey/Logic/PandNotP.html [https://perma.cc/JWA3-LC8K]   
54.  I am tempted to say that causative mental states can make a moral difference only if they 
are “anomalous” in a Davidsonian sense. See Steven Yalowitz, Anomalous Monism, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2014), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/anomalous-monism (“There are no strict laws on the 
basis of which mental events can predict, explain, or be predicted or explained by other events.”). It is 
probably best, however, to avoid the baggage that might come with adopting Davidson’s conception. 
Another way of saying that mental states are autonomous of brain states is to say that they are not 
“supervenient” on brain states—that is, the properties of mental states are independent of, and not 
necessarily co-variant with, the properties of their underlying brain states. See Brian McLaughin & 
Karen Bennett, Supervenience, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winer 
2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience. My own view is that mental states almost 
certainly are supervenient on brain states and therefore not autonomous (as I think is the dominant view 
among specialists concerned about these issues). The reason for my taking this view is that 
supervenience seems to be required by physicalism (or, more specifically, the Causal Closure principle 
discussed supra note 16 and accompanying text and supra note 37). However, I have never seen 
reference to proof that mental states are necessarily supervenient as a matter of empirical fact and, 
accordingly, I think it better not to raise supervenience as a reason for questioning the credibility of the 
mental causation hypothesis. In other words, I am assuming for purposes of argument in the text that 
mental states might be autonomous in order to follow out the implications of saying they are and to show 
the dilemma that such implications pose for an avowed physicalist stance. 
55.  See Mental Causation Fallacy, supra note 3, at 210-12. See also Michael S. Pardo & 
Dennis Patterson, Morse, Mind and Mental Causation, 11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 111, 121 [16 online version] 
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a moral difference, a way must be found to theorize mental states as 
unshackled from their physiological base. Mental states would have to be 
able to produce other mental states as a person’s stream of consciousness 
flows along, and they would have to be able to produce physical impulses 
in the motor neurons (that signal the muscles to contract) so that the results 
of the mind’s reasoning could be realized as physical actions and behavior.56 
In short, if it is true that mechanistically-determined neuronal causation of 
wrongdoing alone does not justify infliction of punishment, the addition of 
parallel, piggy-backing mental causation could not justify it either. For 
mental causation to have a moral significance, the causative mental states 
have to be autonomous and independent of the neurophysiological substrate, 
not mere “Pinocchios” dominated by the brain.57  
For example, the totally brain-bound (and therefore non-autonomous) 
mental causation described by John Searle would not provide a suitable 
basis for justifying attributions of responsibility or blame.58 According to 
Professor Searle, 
the mental is simply a feature (at the level of the system) of the 
physical structure of the brain . . . . [C]ausally speaking, there are not 
two independent phenomena, the conscious effort and the 
unconscious neuron firings. There is just the brain system, which has 
one level of description where neuron firings are occurring and 
 
 
(2017) (making essentially the same point and suggesting that Professor Morse needs an alternative to 
mental causation as the basis for ascribing responsibility).   
As further described in Mental Causation Fallacy, supra note 3, at 211-12, the “victim of neuronal 
circumstances” hypothesis comes from a much-noted article by Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen. 
Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, PHIL. 
TRANS. ROYAL SOC’Y 1775–1785 (2004). In that article, Greene and Cohen pointed to the considerable 
evidence that everything a person does is determined by biomechanical neuronal processes, with 
wrongdoers haplessly acting out the prescribed script of fate.   
56.  Stated another way, the mind would have to be able to pursue sequences of reasoning from 
given starting points to conclusions that are not the same as the conclusions that are reached by the 
biomechanical computations of the brain. The mind would have to be able, moreover, to inject its 
behavioral choices into the appropriate pre-motor brain areas so the motor neurons would be caused to 
activate the muscles accordingly.  
57.  See Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 2, at 49 (“We are not Pinocchios and our brains 
are not Geppettos pulling the strings.”). It is said to be “widely accepted” that mental states are not 
autonomous and that there are “lawful [nomological] correlations between sensory experiences and 
physical/functional states” of the brain. KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 126-27. The point here in 
the text is not, however, to take a position on that “widely accepted” view or to invoke it as an argument 
against mental-state autonomy. Rather, the only point being made in the text is that one would have to 
forsake physicalism in order to embrace such autonomy, since the two are inconsistent.  













another level of description, the level of the system, where the system 
is conscious and indeed consciously trying to raise its arm.59  
If Professor Searle is correct that behavior-causing mental states and 
physical brain states are just two “levels of description” of the same thing, 
then the “two” would have exactly the same causal effects and, accordingly, 
would produce the exact same behavior. As long as we assume (with Searle) 
that neuron firings occur in accordance with physical laws, it follows that 
the successive states of a person’s overall “brain system” (and therefore of 
her successive mental states) are also dictated by physical laws.60 If that is 
so, then any mental causation that may appear to exist would not be 
autonomous but would simply be a mirroring of the physical succession of 
brain states. As such, it would add no independent factual element, beyond 
the neuronal, that could justify blaming and punishment. In such a picture it 
would still be the firing of neurons, not the dependent mental states, that 
would be “in control” and doing the real causal work. It would, in other 
words, still be the person’s brain states, not her mental states, that are the 
morally-relevant causes of her wrongs.61 She would be, in short, a “victim 
 
 
59.  Id. 
60.  SEARLE, supra note 58, at 114, 209 (“mental processes … have no causal powers in 
addition to those of the underlying neurobiology” and “there is no causal efficacy to consciousness that 
is not reducible to the causal efficacy of its neuronal basis”). 
61.  This is essentially, I think, the point that is made by the co-called “exclusion principle,” 
which says, roughly, if an event has a sufficient physical cause and also a mental cause, and the two are 
not factually independent in their origins, then the physical cause “excludes” the mental cause—or, more 
precisely:  
If an event e has a sufficient cause c at time t, no event at t distinct from c can be a cause of e 
(unless this is a genuine case of causal overdetermination). 
KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 17. See generally id. at 17-22. What this means for the present 
discussion is, in broad paraphrase:  
When it appears that mental states and the brain states on which they depend are both 
simultaneously causing certain conduct, and the brain states alone would be sufficient to cause 
the conduct, then the actual causal work is being done only by the brain states and only they 
can be properly regarded as the cause. 
It should be noted, however, that the exclusion principle does not in itself “disprove” the possibility of 
autonomous mental causation unconditionally, but only does so if there is a sufficient physical cause. In 
other words, the exclusion principle would only hold that mental causation is impossible if every 
physical event does indeed either have no cause or have a sufficient physical cause (i.e., if Causal Closure 
is true, see supra note 16 and accompanying text). While it seems likely that Causal Closure is true, one 
cannot of course disprove autonomous mental causation by assuming the truth of Causal Closure without 
completely begging the question. What the exclusion principle does say, however, is that, as long as 
mental states are not “distinct” from (i.e., not autonomous from) underlying brain states, they cannot be 
properly considered the causes of conduct, since the brain states would be doing all the causal work. 
Professor Morse attempts to brush aside the exclusion principle citing an article that provides, he 
says, “plausible philosophical reason to believe” that the principle, appropriately reformulated, actually 
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of neuronal circumstances.”62 If victims of neuronal circumstances are not 
responsible63 then Professor Searle, though he has succeeded in maintaining 
his commitment to both mental causation and physicalism, has done so by 
conceiving of mental causation in a way that denies it is autonomous and, 
therefore, denudes it of distinctive moral significance.64  
The crucial importance of mental-state autonomy to responsibility has 
not been lost on those who see culpable mental states as a basis of criminal 
responsibility.65 Indeed, mental-state autonomy seems to be taken for 
granted in the folk psychology that underlies the criminal law. As Professor 
Morse has written, the criminal law “presupposes a ‘folk psychological’ 
view [that] causally explains behavior in part by mental states such as 
desires, beliefs, intentions, willings, and plans,”66 and it is an “incoherent 
notion” to have genuine responsibility without the ability to act 
intentionally, rationally and for reasons.67 Statements like these recognize 
that, if the content of mental states is dictated by mechanistic brain states 
 
 
allows for mental causation. Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 2, at 34, citing Christian List & Peter 
Menzies, Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle, CVI J. OF PHIL. 425 
(2009). It appears, however, that Professor Morse is “overclaiming.” Without getting too deep into the 
weeds, the main problem with relying on the cited article is that it does not (by its own admission) use 
the definition of “cause” (viz. “generative” or “productive” causation) that is generally accepted in 
discussions of the exclusion principle. See KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 18. In consequence, the 
reasoning of the List & Menzies article slips past the gravamen of the exclusion principle like a ship 
passing in the night. See also Jose Luis Bermudez & Arnon Cahen, Mental Causation and 
Counterfactuals, in CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE ONTOLOGY OF PROPERTIES, 155-173 (Mihretu P. Guta 
ed., 2019) (critiquing the List & Menzies analysis). 
62.  See supra note 55. 
63.  And Professor Morse contends they are not, due to lack of agency. See Common Sense, 
supra note 23, at 67; Inevitable Mind, supra note 2, at 46.   
64.  It appears that the same can be said of Hilary Bok’s analysis in Want to Understand Free 
Will? Don't Look to Neuroscience, CHRON. OF HIGHER ED. online (Mar. 18, 2012), 
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Hilary-Bok-Want-to-Understand/131168 [https://perma.cc/GT9B-
4DNE ] (“[T]he claim that a person chose her action does not conflict with the claim that some neural 
processes or states caused it; it simply redescribes it.”). 
65.  Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 2, at 35. But cf. Katrina L. Sifferd, What Does It Mean 
to Be a Mechanism? Stephen Morse, Non-reductivism, and Mental Causation, 11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 143 
(2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2512325 [https://perma.cc/5TNP-RB3E] 
(arguing that even if the mental is reduced to the physical “[i]ntentional mental states are real, and they 
cause action because they are physical things in the world that participate in causal relations”) (emphasis 
added). Professor Sifferd does not however explain how, if mental states are “physical things,” they 
could possibly have the distinctly moral implications for responsibility that physical brain states do not.  
66.  Morse, Common Sense, supra note 23, at 49. Accord, Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 
2, at 35 (“[R]esponsibility judgments depend on … mental states”); Morse, Common Sense, supra note 
23, at 40, 69 (“[N]o responsibility is possible if we are not agents”); and Morse, Translation, supra note 
43, at 531 (the law views “the person as a conscious … creature who forms and acts on intentions that 
are the themselves the product of the person’s other mental states such as desires, beliefs, willings, and 
plans.”). 













and the two of them always produce the exact same behavior, then 
wrongdoers would be in essence “victims of neuronal circumstances” and, 
as such, not responsible for their misdeeds.68 To say that brain states are 
mechanistic is to say that the brain is essentially like a machine and, though 
“machines may cause harm, … they cannot do wrong [or] deserve … 
punishment.”69 Therefore, criminal responsibility requires there to be 
something more to the gubernation of human behavior than just the 
biomechanical operations of “an intricate, organic electrochemical 
machine.”70 And the “something more” that is required to make persons 
criminally responsible cannot just be the “piggybacking” variety of mental 
causation that does no more than replicate the causal results that the physical 
brain would produce anyway. There has to be autonomous mental causation 
that is causally independent of the physical and, indeed, able to override the 
forces of physical causation generated by the brain.71 But autonomous 
mental causation flatly contradicts the physicalist premise that physical 
events cannot be produced by non-physical (immaterial or spectral-spirit) 
causes.72 The position that people are responsible and deserve punishment 
based on mental causation contradicts a commitment to even a minimal 
physicalism. This contradiction creates serious doubts as to the justness of 
a criminal justice system that systematically inflicts hardship, deprivation 
and misery on millions of people on the theory that non-physical mental 
states cause physical criminal acts. 
It is, of course, easy enough to see why theorists like Professor Morse 
have been driven to this contradiction: Not wanting to place themselves at 
odds with modern mainstream scholarship, neuroskeptics must eschew the 
out-of-favor “notion that we have an immaterial mind or soul that is 
somehow in causal relation with our physical body.”73 But causally 
efficacious mental states that are operationally autonomous of the physical 
domain are, by definition, “immaterial.” It is not consistent to say both that 
“we inhabit a thoroughly material, physical universe” and also that we are 
“creatures who act intentionally for reasons, who can be guided by 
 
 
68.  See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
69.  Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 2, at 34. 
70.  Id. at 33-34. 
71.  Morse, Common Sense, supra note 23, at 49 (stating that “genuine responsibility” can only 
exist if people “have the capacity to determine their actions by reasons and to act in light of those 
reasons”). 
72.  Certainly, Professor Morse concedes this truism and perhaps even slightly overstates it. 
See Morse, Common Sense, supra note 23, at 47 (“[A]ll phenomena are caused by physical laws”); 
Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 2, at 33. In other words, autonomous mental causation contradicts 
the principle of Causal Closure. See supra notes 16, 36. 
73.  Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 2, at 33. 
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reasons.”74 Ardently seeking to avoid the trap of substance dualism,75 
Professor Morse appears in the end to have traded it in for a fundamental 
contradiction instead. 
Understandable or not, however, this contradiction is a considerable 
problem for any theory of responsibility that tries to embrace both 
physicalism and autonomous mental causation. Its presence in an argument 
for responsibility and punishment based on mental causation means the 
conclusion—that punishment is “deserved”—is not supported by lines of 
argument that coherently follow from a set of consistent premises. A 
conclusion that proceeds from contradictory premises is not reliable.76 By 
accepting both physicalism as well as immaterial, preternatural causes, the 
compatibilist/neuroskeptic case for responsibility and punishment can only 
be deemed inconclusive, at best. Instead of establishing that “mental 
causation” provides a morally just basis for subjecting millions of people to 
the hardship and deprivation called punishment, internally inconsistent 
arguments that stray from the path of physicalism into the murky realm of 
incorporeal forces only reinforce the conclusion that no such case for 
punishment can be made.  
II. PROPERTY DUALISM AND EMERGENTISM 
While the long-dominant (and decidedly non-physicalist) idea that the 
brain and mind are separate substances fell into disfavor during the last 
century,77 the view has persisted that the mind and brain are fundamentally 
different in nature. In place of the old discredited “substance dualism,”78 
 
 
74.  Morse, Common Sense, supra note 23, at 40.  
75.  Professor Morse, for example, wants it to be very clear that he is not contemplating any 
form of substance dualism. See Morse, Translation, supra note 43, at 536 (“[I]t may seem, therefore, as 
if law’s emphasis on the importance of mental states as causing behavior is based on a pre-scientific, 
outmoded form of dualism, but this is not the case.”). 
76.  When a premise is a logical contradiction, everything follows as a logical conclusion from 
it. See Tom Ramsey, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF LOGIC,  
http://www.math.hawaii.edu/~ramsey/Logic/PandNotP.html [https://perma.cc/F24Q-4RJJ]. 
77.  KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 151. 
78.  Id. at 156 (“Applied to the present context, substance dualism posits the existence of both 
physical bodies and nonphysical minds whereas physicalism admits the existence only of physical 













new hypotheses known as “property dualism” 79 and “emergentism,”80 have 
been proposed to reconcile mental causation with physicalism. The basic 
strategy of these hypotheses is to agree that there is only one kind of 
“substance,” namely physical (hence, physicalism is true), but to argue 
nonetheless that mental states can exist as something distinct from the 
physical because salient non-physical properties can “emerge” out of 
arrangements and systems of physical stuff.81 For example, a recognizable 
image of Mickey Mouse can “emerge” out of a bunch of glowing pixel dots 
on a computer screen. Even though the image is physically just a collection 
of luminescent dots, it can have aesthetic and symbolic properties that are 
“over and above” the physical properties of the dots themselves. Because 
the emergent image has non-physical properties that are over and above the 
physical properties of its constituents, the situation can be referred to as a 
case of “property dualism”; there is only one substance (physical) but it has 
two kinds of properties, physical and non-physical. 
In the mental-causation context, the point of property dualism and 
emergentism is to allow one to disavow the “substance dualism” idea that 
the mind and body are different substances82 while still maintaining that 
mental states are different and distinct from their underlying physical base 
and, as such, are potentially able to have causal properties that are 
independent of the physical. For example, one could claim that, even though 
a particular pattern of synaptic discharges is physical in nature, the pattern 
of discharges can have non-physical properties by being experienced in 
consciousness as, say, the redness of cherries, the pain of a pinprick or an 
 
 
79.  Property dualism is the idea that physical events can have non-physical properties that 
cannot be fully explained by the properties of the underling physical substrate itself. See KIM, 
PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 20–22, 156–61; Howard Robinson, Dualism, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2017), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/dualism/. Unlike substance dualism, property 
dualism accepts that there is only one substance—the physical—but, as explained in the text, it finds 
hope for mental causation in the idea that physical substances, such as arrangements of atoms, can have 
non-physical properties, such as consciousness.   
80.  Emergentism is a form of property dualism which holds that certain arrangements of atoms 
can give rise to discernible objects and properties whose behavior cannot be entirely accounted for by 
the properties of the atoms themselves. For example, arrangements of dots can be viewed as a picture 
that has properties over and above the properties of the dots themselves, or certain arrangements of 
atoms or neural firings can give rise to conscious states with properties over and above those of the 
atoms or neural firings themselves. KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 157–58 (“In addition to 
physical properties [of the substance of the brain], there are physically irreducible domains of emergent 
properties, of which mental properties are the leading candidates.”). 
81.  See, e.g., Morse, Common Sense, supra note 23, at 48; Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 
2, at 34 (though the “mind/brain … is only one substance, it has both physical and mental properties 
[and the] latter are emergent and cannot be reduced fully to the former”). 
82.  See supra note 78. 
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intention to commit a crime. The way that the redness of cherries “looks” 
or the intention to commit a crime subjectively “feels” is a 
phenomenological experience that emerges from the physical firings of 
neurons but which is in itself non-physical and is therefore different and 
distinct from (“over and above”) the neuron firings that underlie it.83 
Similarly, other patterns of synaptic discharges within populations of 
neurons can give rise to other emergent mental-state experiences (in 
addition to seeing, feeling and intending), such as recalling, imagining, 
reasoning, believing and all the other furniture of our mental lives. None of 
this phenomenological richesse is considered to be inconsistent with 
physicalism because all of these emergent mental states, although not 
themselves physical stuff located in time and space, can nonetheless be said 
to be properties (albeit non-physical properties) of the underlying, physical 
neuronal activity. 
While property dualism and emergentism may be reasonable ways to 
conceptualize certain aspects of our lived experience, there are problems 
with using them to reconcile physicalism with autonomous mental 
causation. The reason is that one of the “rules” of property dualism is that 
the dependent (or emergent) properties have to co-vary with the independent 
ones.84 For example, two paintings cannot be physically identical in every 
respect and still depict two different scenes or have two different sets of 
aesthetic qualities.85 Accordingly, property dualism does not authorize the 
conclusion that a given pattern of neuronal firings can give rise to two or 
more different mental states, or that sequences of mental states can wander 
autonomously of their physical base. A given pattern of neuronal firings 
cannot spawn different mental states like a frog spawns tadpoles, which are 
free to swim off wherever they please. If mental states are rooted in brain 
states, as property dualism contends, they must co-vary with the brain states 
that they are properties of—and sequences of mental states are therefore 
subject to the same computational rules as their underlying brain states. Any 
physical causation by such mental states would, accordingly, not be 
autonomous. On the contrary, even if such mental states are causally 
efficacious, they would be mere conduits carrying behavioral instructions 
generated and determined by the computational brain. The behavior that is 
 
 
83.  See KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 154. 
84.  See DAVID LEWIS, ON THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS 14 (1986) (“[N]o two [dot-matrix] 
pictures could differ in their global properties without differing, somewhere, in whether there is or there 
isn't a dot.”); KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 20.  













caused by such mental states would still be determined (though at one 
remove) by the underlying brain activity. 
Likewise, emergentism (a form of property dualism) does not mean that 
mental states can emerge from physical brain states like a genie from a 
bottle, wielding magical powers to override physical laws.86 There is 
sometimes confusion in this regard owing to the fact that there seem to be 
“laws” or lawlike regularities at emergent levels (for example, “laws” of 
biology, psychology, or aesthetics) that are not reducible to the physical 
laws that apply at underlying levels. For example, how can physical laws 
ever explain why one painting of Paris is beautiful and another is atrocious? 
Obviously, we can cognitively discern “higher-level” laws as we observe 
that some emergent entities fit together like a lock and key or otherwise 
interact with regularity while others do not, depending on the properties and 
configurations of the matter that comprises them. But there is no evidence 
that these lawlike regularities of interactions that are cognitively discerned 
among emergent entities, such as individual biological beings, are ever able 
to override the physical laws that are applicable at the base level. There is 
no evidence, in other words, that distinct “higher-level” forces ever emerge 
with ability to move or displace a single molecule—much less an arm or a 
leg—in opposition to the ordinary physical forces described in physical 
laws.  
In sum, both property dualism and emergentism take the view that 
physicalism does not rule out the possibility that physical states and objects 
can have non-physical properties and that mental states are non-physical 
properties of the neuronal activity that gives rise to them. As such, however, 
mental states are dependent on the physical substrate that they are properties 
of, not autonomous from it. Neither property dualism nor emergentism is, 
therefore, able to reconcile the contradiction between mental-causation 
autonomy and physicalism.87 That is, neither is able to change the fact that 
 
 
86.  “How it is that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as a result 
of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of the Djin, when Aladdin rubbed 
his lamp.” THOMAS HUXLEY, LESSONS ON ELEMENTARY PHYSIOLOGY 193 (1866). 
87.  There is, of course, much more to be said about emergence, see, e.g., Timothy O’Connor 
& Hong Yu Wong, Emergent Properties, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta 
ed., Summer 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/properties-emergent/. 
Whatever else may be said about it, however, this much seems clear: The individuation of objects and 
events that we see in nature is imposed by us as observers and not an ontological given. Emergence 
appears to occur essentially because of the way we conceptualize, individuate and give names to higher-
level abstractions, regularities and aggregations that we cognitively discern in the weltering, 
undifferentiated chaos of nature. There is, however, nothing in our conceptualizing, individuation and 
name-giving per se that would allow what we see as a process in nature to actually jump the rails of 
fundamental physical law and ramble off to establish a law unto itself. Emergence is not, in other words, 
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a commitment to physicalism excludes mental-state autonomy and, 
accordingly, excludes the possibility that mental causation (even if it 
occurs) could provide moral significance to crimes and other physically-
determined bodily acts.    
III. “NONREDUCTIVE” PHYSICALISM 
Another strategy to escape the contradiction at the core of the 
neuroskeptical thesis has been to appeal to a custom-tailored alternative to 
actual physicalism known as nonreductive physicalism.88 Nonreductive 
physicalism accepts that “we inhabit a thoroughly material, physical 
universe,”89 but it contends nonetheless that, though the “mind/brain … is 
only one substance, it has both physical and mental properties [and the] 
latter are emergent and cannot be reduced fully to the former.”90 The 
nonreductive physicalist believes, in other words, that it is a mistake to think 
that intentions, reasons and other mental states are “nothing more than” 
electrical activity in the neurons of the brain. Rather, these mental states are 
something “over and above” the underlying brain processes that bring them 
about.91 It is accordingly not possible to fully explain or understand mental 
states in terms of the brain states that co-occur with them—unlike, say, the 
workings of a laptop computer, which can be fully understood and explained 
in terms of the transistors and other electronics that comprise it. The idea is 
that there is more to mental states than just an aggregation of physical 
activity in the brain.92  
 
 
the magic key that unlocks the conundrum that faces neuroskeptics as a result of their contradictory 
stances toward the physicalism of human behavior. 
88.  See generally KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 94-98. Professor Morse, for example, 
states that he is “most attracted” to nonreductive physicalism. Morse, Common Sense, supra note 23, at 
48. Though treated separately in the text, property dualism, emergentism and nonreductive physicalism 
are not distinct hypotheses but are ways of looking at the same hypothesis, namely, that property dualism 
is a feature of reality because non-physical properties can emerge from physical arrangements and 
systems and these emergent non-physical properties are not necessarily reducible to underlying physical 
properties.  
89.  Morse, Common Sense, supra note 23, at 47; Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 2, at 33.  
90.  Morse, Common Sense, supra note 23, at 48; Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 2, at 34 
(emphasis added). “There is no consensus on exactly how nonreductive physicalism is to be formulated, 
for the simple reason that there is no consensus about either how physicalism is to be formulated or how 
we should understand reduction.” KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 33, 94, 98. It seems, however, 
clear that nonreductive physicalism means, at the very least, that mental states are in a separate 
ontological class from physical reality and that they do not consist solely of physical matter, 
arrangements of physical matter or physical states.     
91.  See KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 34. 
92.  To draw the key contrast between ordinary physicalism and nonreductive physicalism: In 
ordinary physicalism, mental events must co-vary in every particular with the underlying physical events 













To be sure, nonreductive physicalism in itself is not necessarily an 
unsound hypothesis and, indeed, it is “probably the dominant view among 
specialists.”93 And there is good reason. After all, though we do not know 
the precise quiddity of consciousness, few would seriously deny that people 
have minds in addition to brains94 or that the way a person experiences 
conscious mental events is something “over and above” the physical activity 
that goes on in the neurons. Mental states as subjectively experienced have 
a non-physical nature that no one yet has managed to describe in purely 
physical terms. For example, it seems distinctly unlikely that what it is like 
to be conscious of the redness of cherries, the melodies of songbirds, or the 
flavor of pinot noir is the same identical thing as the physical brain activity 
(synaptic firing) that gives rise to these sensations. It has never been 
persuasively shown, at any rate, how conscious sensations such as these can 
be “reduced” to or fully described in terms of purely physical events. Yet, 
the existence of such sensations cannot be credibly denied, and our 
consciousness of them is, when you get down to it, the only thing our minds 
can actually directly know.95 They are, in a sense, our entire lived 
experience. The apparently universal existence of conscious awareness in 
human experience is reason enough in itself to make nonreductive 
physicalism the “dominant view.”96  
 
 
See KIM, supra note 1, at 212-16; KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 33-34. Accordingly, the 
occurrence, content and flow of mental states would, on analysis, always turn out to mirror underlying 
physical events because (according to physicalism) everything having a concrete existence can be fully 
explained and accounted for in physical terms and must, therefore, have a physical cause (or no cause). 
See id. One important consequence of this feature of physicalism is that, if physicalism is true, the mind 
could not wander off on paths of its own and autonomously cause behavior that the physical operations 
of the brain would not cause anyway. Nonreductive physical posits that mental states can have non-
physical properties whose autonomy is not similarly constrained. 
93.  Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 2, at 34; see also Morse, Common Sense, supra note 
23, at 47. 
94.  See Galen Strawson, The Consciousness Deniers, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 13, 2018, 
http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/ [https://perma.cc/JP93-PNXR] 
(“What is the silliest claim ever made? The competition is fierce, but I think the answer is easy. Some 
people have denied the existence of consciousness.”). 
95.  See, e.g., Arthur Schopenhauer, II WORLD AS WILL AND REPRESENTATION 5 (E.F.J. Trans. 
1968) (1859). As physicist Arthur Eddington once wrote: “But no one can deny that mind is the first and 
most direct thing in our experience, and all else is remote inference.” ARTHUR EDDINGTON, THE 
NATURE OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD 281 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1928), 
http://henry.pha.jhu.edu/Eddington.2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/U86H-C6W3]. 
96.  Just to head off a possible accusation of inconsistency, let me hasten to clarify that there is 
an important difference between relying on introspection as evidence that non-physical mental states 
exist and relying on introspection as evidence that they are causally efficacious. In the first case, we are 
saying that conscious sensations that we experience as direct apercus are, as sensations, proof of their 
own existence. But mental causation is not a direct apercu but, at best, only an inference that is drawn 
from apercus, and a fallacious one at that. See Mental Causation Fallacy, supra note 3, at 224-38. 
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It is a bit of a reach, however, to say that the nonreducibility of mental 
states supports the mental causation hypothesis. Merely accepting the truth 
of nonreductive physicalism does not resolve the inherent contradiction 
facing the neuroskeptic who wants to claim the mantle of physicalism but 
still suppose that mental causation can occur autonomously of the physical 
(and, therefore, be morally significant).97 After all, nonreductive 
physicalism does not in itself imply mental causation or, for that matter, any 
causation at all, either from mind to body or from body to mind. It holds 
only that mental states can have properties that are not reducible to physical 
properties of co-occurring brain states; it says nothing about the causal 
powers of those properties. It is one thing to observe that people have 
conscious awareness and infer from it that non-physical (mental) 
phenomena must therefore be able to emerge out of physical (neuronal) 
events with properties beyond those inhering in the physical. But it is pure 
non-sequitur to turn that emergence into a causal arrow in the opposite 
direction and infer that non-physical mental states can produce physical 
events (such as bodily movements) on their own, without depending on 
underlying brain events to do the actual causal work.98 The latter inference 
is like noting that electrical activity in your television determines what 
appears on the screen and then concluding that the events you see on the 
screen can change what happens inside the set.99  
The inference that conscious awareness cannot be fully reduced to co-
occurring brain activity is based on what we know from neuroscience 
together with the vivid experience of consciousness that it would be quixotic 
to deny. By contrast, the inference that non-physical mental-state properties 
can produce physical bodily movements is pure speculation, with no basis 
in evidence other than bare correlation.100 To infer mind-to-body causation 
from this correlation alone, absent any indication of causal mechanism, is 
to reason post hoc ergo propter hoc—a logical fallacy.101 Indeed, it is worse 
than that: In order for intentions, reasons and other nonreducible mental 
 
 
97.  As previously discussed, the causal autonomy of mental states is important because mental 
causation in the causal chain of behavior would seem to have no special moral significance if the causal 
effects of mental events exactly duplicated the effects that would be produced by physical processes 
anyway. See supra notes 53-76 and accompanying text. 
98.  See, e.g., JOHN R. SEARLE, MIND: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 114, 209 (2004) (“[M]ental 
processes…have no causal powers in addition to those of the underlying neurobiology” and “there is no 
causal efficacy to consciousness that is not reducible to the causal efficacy of its neuronal basis.”). 
99.  Of course, many computers now have “touchscreens” that are, in effect, transparent input 
devices placed on top of the screen itself. As input devices, these can of course affect what happens 
inside the computer. But the images on the actual screen can not affect what happens inside. 
100.  See Mental Causation Fallacy, supra note 3, at 224-38. 













properties to produce bodily movements autonomously—i.e., movements 
that the brain’s physical processes do not already direct the production of—
the mental properties would have to be able to cause physical events to occur 
in opposition to the physical brain’s directions and hence in opposition to 
physical law. Nonreductive physicalism does not resolve but, if anything, 
exacerbates the contradiction between the mental-causation hypothesis and 
the commitment to physicalism that predominates in modern thought. 
So, while nonreductive physicalism may be an attractive hypothesis for 
reconciling a physicalist view of the world with the subjective experience 
of consciousness, which science has not explained, it does not support a leap 
to the conclusion that nonreducible mental states can cause bodily 
movement that science can explain. Accordingly, even if nonreductive 
physicalism is true, as it probably is (in limited applications), it does not 
support a valid inference of mental causation. The case for mental causation 
can only stand on the premise that physical events (like human conduct) can 
be produced by non-physical causes. But this is a premise that is not only at 
odds with physicalism but, even more importantly, remains utterly 
undemonstrated in any context anywhere in the Universe.  
IV. WHY THE NEUROSKEPTIC’S CONTRADICTION IS IMPORTANT 
The friends of mental causation may claim to accept the truth of 
physicalism, but their embrace of it is an uneasy one. Why should this 
matter? After all, although the truth of physicalism is strongly supported by 
observations from throughout the Universe, it is not an ontological 
certainty,102 and it is hard to see how any physicalist position can be 
unqualified as long as the quiddity of consciousness remains unknown. 
Indeed, for most of human history nearly everyone believed that 
physicalism was false. The existence of non-physical forces and paranormal 
powers were taken for granted, and stories about them abounded. The 
bewildering mosaic of contradictory beliefs that people still firmly hold 
today, religious and non-religious, are testimony to the rich spiritual life, 
capacities and imagination of humankind.  
To be sure, everyone has a right to an abiding faith in the reality of non-
physical forces including autonomous mental causation, and those who hold 
such beliefs are not to be disdained. But the question in the context of 
criminal justice is not about freedom of conscience nor is it just an academic 
matter of metaphysical debate. The question is, bluntly, whether the legal 
 
 
102.  See Papineau, supra note 33. 
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system of a secular government can justify the systematic infliction of 
hardship, deprivation and misery on its people based on world-views that 
do not include a strong presumption of physicalism and a definite preference 
for physical (versus non-physical) explanations of the events that occur.103 
While all are entitled to their beliefs, we should hesitate to accept moral 
instruction from those who reject such a common-sense presumption and 
whose commitment to basic physical reality is therefore so open to question. 
It is at least prudent to view with suspicion their assertion that people 
deserve to be made to suffer because their actions can be produced by their 
intentions and reasons rather than ordinary physical causes. It is particularly 
prudent if one does not share the faith-system and shaky commitment to 




103.  See KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 10, at 156 (“Motivations for introducing entities other 
than material things vary—from supposed philosophical requirements in connection with certain issues, 
for example, the persistence of persons over time, the possible survival of bodily death, and they special 
directness of knowledge of one's own mind, to religious imperatives and mystical intimations.”). Oddly, 
Kim does not mention the impetus to satisfy the retributive appetite for bringing suffering and misery to 
human beings in the guise of justice, since this seems to be (though often cloaked in high sounding words 
like responsibility) a primary motivating factor, especially among authors who discuss the topic from a 
law-related perspective. 
104.  Just to be clear (because it always comes up): There is nothing in the findings of 
neuroscience to suggest that confinement and other coercive measures are not sometimes necessary in 
the interest of protecting the public from persons who present an unreasonable or socially intolerable 
risk of harm to others. See Mental Causation Fallacy, supra note 3, at 243-53. But, as further discussed 
id., the nature and quality of those measures may be very different if they are treated as regrettable 
necessities rather than as deserved.   
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